
Economics & Growth | Monetary Policy & Inflation | US
Economics & Growth | Monetary Policy & Inflation | US
This article is only available to Macro Hive subscribers. Sign-up to receive world-class macro analysis with a daily curated newsletter, podcast, original content from award-winning researchers, cross market strategy, equity insights, trade ideas, crypto flow frameworks, academic paper summaries, explanation and analysis of market-moving events, community investor chat room, and more.
The September employment report was very strong overall. Headline NFP was 254,000 against 150,000 expected, and two-month revisions totalled 72,000 (Table 1 and Chart 1). Sam’s model had predicted the upside surprise.
Employment in the household survey increased 430,000 unadjusted and 666,000 adjusted to NFP definitions, narrowing the difference between these series and the NFP (Chart 2). The unusually large difference reflects the undercounting of illegal migrants in the household survey since 2022.
The release details show an increasingly tight labour market:
Against these signs of tightness, hours worked fell further to 34.2 against 34.4 on average in 2019 (Chart 9). However, this reflects a change in worker preferences post-pandemic: full-time work has been falling, and voluntary part-time work increasing (Chart 10). Total hours worked 3mma were unchanged in September.
This tightening may well continue.
Immigration surged after 2021, as shown by Border Patrol encounters with illegal migrants (Charts 11 and 12). In June 2024, however, the administration tightened the border and immigration decreased, though no precise data is available.
The recent decrease in unemployment and acceleration in wage growth could reflect the end of the 2022-24 immigration surge. First, immigration likely drove the recent unemployment increase. All the recent increase in unemployment was in uninsured unemployment, consistent with large inflows of undocumented migrants unable to access unemployment insurance (Chart 3). In addition, because undocumented migrants tend to be low skill, they can take longer to find jobs and could have driven the decline in the job-finding rate after 2022 (Chart 6).
The unemployment rate of foreign-born workers is traditionally below that of native-born workers. Yet from 2022 onwards the former rose above the latter, which is also consistent with a surge in unskilled migrants taking longer to find jobs. Since most undocumented migrants come from Latin America, this could also explain why the spread of Hispanic over white unemployment rose in a tight labour market (Chart 5).
Second, wage growth was unusually low in the recovery, with real wages regaining their pre-pandemic level only in 2023 (Chart 14). Furthermore, the spread between low and high wage growth, which had widened during the pandemic, started shrinking in 2022 and is now below pre-pandemic. This could reflect that low-skill migrants compete mainly with low-wage workers.
If indeed immigration was the main driver of rising unemployment and low wage growth, the labour market is likely to tighten further and wage growth remain high. This is because a re-opening of the border seems politically unsustainable.
This time around, extreme weather had no discernible impact on activity. This is shown by a low number of workers not at work because of weather but still on the payroll and therefore counted as employed (Chart 15). However, temporary layoffs remained tightly correlated with this series.
This correlation is higher than pre-pandemic, which signals lower business resiliency. That is, businesses hit by extreme weather are more prone to putting their workers on temporary layoffs than before the pandemic. This signals weaker balance sheets and/or tighter access to credit and is consistent with small business surveys and with the rise in delinquencies on commercial and industrial loans at small banks that tend to lend to SMEs (Chart 16).
In his 30 September Q&A, Chair Powell explained that growth and employment data had been sending conflicting signals, with employment data weaker than growth. Historically, he explained, employment had proven the more reliable indicator. However, following the recent GDP revisions, he was more confident on growth resiliency.
Friday’s NFP release has likely added to Powell’s confidence that this time, the growth data has been more reliable than the employment data. Powell, who has repeatedly stressed immigration’s positive role, is likely well aware of its impact on labour market data – for instance, in the unusual combination of higher NFPs with rising unemployment.
After Friday’s data, I still expect the Fed to stick to its 2024 plan for two additional 25bp cuts, likely at the November and December FOMC meetings. The Fed tends to move slowly and will need more than a couple of data points to revise its policy plans. Markets are currently pricing 1.9 cuts by December, down from 2.7 before the NFPs.
Longer term, the Fed could face tougher policy choices. So far, the Fed has been lucky with positive supply shocks, including the 2022-24 immigration surge, that have enabled disinflation with strong growth. If the immigration surge is over, the Fed could start facing the traditional trade-off between inflation and employment.
If so, continued labour market tightening creates a risk that the Fed will have to reassess its medium-term easing plans. However, such a reassessment is unlikely before the elections, since these could have a deep impact on next year’s macro backdrop.
Spring sale - Prime Membership only £3 for 3 months! Get trade ideas and macro insights now
Your subscription has been successfully canceled.
Discount Applied - Your subscription has now updated with Coupon and from next payment Discount will be applied.