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Monetary Policy & Inflation | US
Monetary Policy & Inflation | US
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As consensus and I expected, the Fed hiked the Federal Fund band 75bp to 3.75–4%. The economic assessment in the statement was identical to September.
During the presser, Chair Jerome Powell made it clear that the persistence of high inflation had disappointed the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC): ‘as the supply side problems had resolved themselves, we would have expected goods price inflation to come down by now. It has, but not to the extent we had hoped. At the same time, you see core services inflation moving up. There is no sense that inflation is coming down. We are exactly where we were a year ago.’
Powell further stressed that the labour market ‘remained extremely tight’ with ‘unemployment at a 50-year low’. Wage growth was flattening out but ‘at a level well above what would be consistent with 2% inflation’. In general, the transmission of policy tightening to the real economy had been limited. This was partly due to households’ ‘strong balance sheets and built-up spending power’ that had offset fiscal headwinds.
The one sector where policy tightening had been effective, housing, would take time to impact inflation. This is because even though the cost of new rentals was falling, those were adjusting faster than the average rent (since rents are typically reset annually).
The statement’s policy guidance section included a new sentence: ‘In determining the pace of future increases in the target range, the Committee will take into account the cumulative tightening of monetary policy, the lags with which monetary policy affects economic activity and inflation, and economic and financial developments.’
However, during the presser, Powell also stressed that the extent of the lags was unknown. ‘The truth is, we don’t have a lot of data on inflation this high in the modern economy. One big difference is that financial conditions react well before, in expectations of monetary policy.’ He mentioned that changes in financial conditions could be transmitted faster to the real economy but stressed, ‘We don’t know that. It is highly uncertain.’
Policy, therefore, had to be based on risk management. Powell believed the Fed could more easily correct over-tightening than under-tightening. ‘If we were to over-tighten, we could then use our tools strongly to support the economy.’ By contrast, under-tightening could see high inflation persist long enough for inflation expectations to be de-anchored, which would make inflation stabilization very costly in terms of employment losses. (Interestingly, the Fed drew the opposite conclusion on the balance of policy risks during the years of low inflation.)
When asked for the staff estimate of the underlying inflation rate, Powell declined to provide a specific number. This suggests that Powell does not have an inflation model he trusts, so policy is likely to remain driven by short-term data developments. Powell stressed that policy would be informed by the broad macro picture, especially labour market developments, as well as inflation data.
Powell made it clear that ‘It’s very premature in my view to be thinking about or talking about pausing our rate hikes. We have a way to go. We need ongoing rate hikes to get to that level of restrictive [policy]. We don’t know where that exactly is.’
He sees three parameters for policy:
Powell turned out more Volker than Burns yesterday. His economic views are becoming closer to mine. Therefore, based on current data trends, I am sticking to my expectations of a close to 8% terminal FFR.
Overall, Powell successfully introduced a forthcoming slowdown in the pace of rate increases without triggering a marked easing of financial conditions. Yet markets, in my view, continue to underprice hikes. Following the meeting, they are pricing about 50bp in December, which I think is inconsistent with inflation, labour market trends, and Powell’s resolve.
Also, markets are now pricing a terminal FFR of 5–5.25%, compared with 4.5–4.75% in the September SEP. I think this is too small an increase: the September SEP expects end-2022 core personal consumption expenditures (PCE) to be 4.5%, which is likely to turn out about 75bp below the actual number. Together, with the resilience of growth and inflation to Fed tightening, it suggests a December SEP terminal rate of around 5.5%–5.75%.
Finally, markets are pricing an end-2023 FFR at 4.75%. The stickiness of inflation suggests that the Fed will remain at the terminal rate far longer than markets expect. I therefore expect an end-2023 FFR close to 8%.
This would be negative for risk assets and imply further curve inversion.
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